We investigate the price performance of initial public o erings IPOs of formally state-owned companies in Australia. On average, privatised IPOs in Australia are underpriced by about 11, which is not signi cantly di erent from the magnitude of underpricing of the privately-owned IPOs. This percentage is also similar to that of privatised share o erings in other OECD countries. In addition, cross-sectional analysis of our sample does not support some traditional theoretical explanations of underpricing for IPOs. However, it appears that the magnitude of underpricing is correlated to the size of issues and the party a iation of the presiding government.
Introduction
There is evidence that government-owned rms are less e cent than comparable private-sector rms Boardman and Vining, 1989 . Signi cant increases in pro tablity and operating e ciency for companies that were privatised through public share offerings has been documented D 'Souza and Megginson, 1999 . To reduce government de cits and improve economic e ciency, a vast transfer of state-owned assets to the private sector has occurred in the past twenty y ears in both developed and developing countries. Australia has been no exception to this trend.
Since the late 1980s, both Commonwealth and State Australian Governments have privatised a signi cant portion of the public sector as a response to scal pressure and a part of continuing process of economic reform. Although most of privatisation takes place in the form of trade sale, some of the most established publicly owned businesses are sold through public share o erings 1 . Subsequent to the large gains in share prices of several major companies such as Telstra and Commonwealth Bank of Australia, some newspaper commentators have suggested that these formally stateowned companies have been sold too cheaply to investors at the cost to the public. They have also suggested that governments may signi cantly underprice such sales solely to please voters for political gains 2 . Do the critics have v alid reasons to believe that political factors in uence o er prices of privatised IPOs? We investigate this issue by studying the sample of Australian formerly state-owned companies which have been privatised and listed on the Australian Stock Exchange.
In general, the evidence of initial returns on public oats of state-owned companies is consistent with that of privately-owned companies: all initial public o erings IPOs tend to be underpriced on average. Several recent i n ternational studies Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997; Jones et al, 1999 conclude that privatised IPOs indeed are underpriced worldwide but there does not appear to be a general tendency for privatisations to be more underpriced than privately owned company IPOs. For example, among the eight countries studied by Dewenter and Malatesta, only the samples in U.K. exhibit a higher degree of underpricing for privatised IPOs, while for the samples in Canada and Malaysia the opposite is true.
This study focuses on the Australian experience. We collect the data for the 10 privatised IPO rms in Australia in the past decade, and address two main issues. First, we w ant to know what the magnitude of the underpricing of state-owned IPOs in Australia is. Second, we identify which factors are important in determining the magnitude of underpricing of privatised Australian IPOs. Our results show that on average the initial rates of return on the rst trading day for privatised IPOs are about 11, which demonstrates that the degree of underpricing for privatised IPOs in Australia is not signi cantly larger than that of privately-owned IPOs. The magnitude of the underpricing of Australian privatised IPOs is also similar to that of the OECD countries as documented in Huang and Levich 1998. We then perform the cross-sectional analysis but do not nd any statistical signi cance for several factors suggested by theories which could a ect the degree of underpricing. However, we have documented that the size of the issues and the degree of underpricing are positively correlated, and also on average, the oats under the Coalition governments which are considered right of the centre in the political spectrum o er higher rst day trading returns for investors than otherwise.
Despite that the magnitude of the underpricing for privatised IPOs is similar to privately-owned IPOs in Australia, it would benaive to claim that the sole purpose of government privatisation is value maximisation. In particular, the Australian Governments have clearly stated their objective of making share ownership the Australian dream of 1990s 3 . Governments consistently have in the past structured the IPO offering to facilitate economic and political objectives. Consequently, share allocations have been tilted to favor domestic investors and employees, foreign ownership has been limited, control restrictions have been imposed on some privatised rms, and domestic investment bankers have been used as co-lead underwriters.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we will review the existing literature on the theory as well as international empirical evidence of underpricing for privatised IPOs. This builds up the foundation for our empirical work. In section 3, we describe the data sample and present the results of the statistical tests. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Literature Review
Reasons of Underpricing for Privitised IPOs
It is well established in nance literature that initial public o erings tend to be underpriced, see Ibbotson et al. 1994 for the U.S. sample, Lee et al. 1996 for the Australian sample, and Loughran et al. 1994 for international evidence. In every study, the evidence indicates that IPOs are underpriced on average, providing large initial returns to investors who are able to buy shares at the o er price.
Among many explanations of the IPO underpricing puzzle, Rock's 1986 model is perhaps the most in uential. In his model, some large institutional investors are assumed to have better information about the quality of new issues than small uninformed investors. Consequently, informed large investors will attempt to buy shares only when an issue is underpriced, but they are subjected to rationing on the amount they can purchase. Uninformed small investors, on the other hand, do not know which issues will beunderpriced or overpriced, and so will be allocated only a fraction of the most desirable new issues, while they are allocated all of the least desirable new issues. Uninformed investors thus face a winner's curse: if they get all of the shares they demand, it is because the informed investors do not want the shares. Faced with this adverse selection problem, uninformed investors will only submit purchase orders if IPOs are underpriced su ciently, on average, to compensate them for the bias in the allocation of new issues.
Several alternative explanations have been proposed in the literature. For example, investment bankers and rm managers may fear litigation for misrepresentation if the new issue declines in price signi cantly soon after issue. This litigation would be based on a claim that the investment banker and the rm omitted material information in the prospectus, see Thakor and Hughes 1991. A rm could rationally underprice to enhance the rm's ability to raise further capital in the market, as argued by W elch 1989. It could also be true that investment bankers have a longer term and more extensive relationship with the purchasers of the new issues rather than the issuers, and will tend to favor the purchasers in exchange for implicit or explicit favors in other deals. Furthermore, investment bankers have a strong incentive to perpetuate the notion that it is an unquali ed disaster if the issue is undersubscribed and deliberate underpricing may reduce the probability of such an outcome.
Many state-owned companies were in well established industries such as transport, telecommunications, and banking, and had long operating history prior to privatisation. It is expected that information asymmetry in the market concerning the market value for those rms would be less severe than otherwise. However, privatisation also has some unique problems because political factors may a ect the o er price and selling mechanism employed. Perotti 1995, Biais and Perotti 1999 provide several arguments in support of higher discounting for privatised IPOs.
When a government sells a state-owned rm through public oat, it may pursue other political and economic objectives other than simply maxmising revenues from the sale. As Perotti 1995 observes, the government in this situation is both the issuer and the regulator. Such a dual role puts it in a position to a ect the value of the rm not only at the initial sale, but also after the sale through income redistribution policy. This exposes investors to an additional problem of information asymmetry regarding a government's commitment t o privatisation.
Perotti 1995 models this policy uncertainty as an asymmetric-information problem in which i n vestors are uncertain whether a government i s populist or committed to pirvatisation. In his model, populist governments cannot resist the political pressure that arises, after privatisation, to redistribute the rm's value. They may a c hieve this by either interfering in operation, changing the regulatory environment, or reversing policy altogether. As the possibility o f c hanges in policy is re ected in the sale price, any g o vernment prefers the annoucement of a policy of restraint. In the absence of a reliable signal, however, only a policy maintained over some time can eliminate the perceived risk. A committed government may take costly action to signal its intent. A partial sale and possibly its underpricing are signals of commitment. When uncertainty regarding a government's future policy toward interference is low, a signaling equilibrium will occur if the government chooses to privatise a rm gradually via partial sales. The initial sale of a small portion of a rm signals that the government, as a major shareholder, is willing to bear most of the redistribution costs associated with subsequent interference in the rm. When uncertainty regarding future policy is high, private investors are likely to perceive that a small initial sale indicates the government does not intend to relinquish control. In this case, underpricing initial sale of large portions of the state-owned is needed to send the market a credible signal.
Underpricing, however, has another political e ect. Biais and Perotti 1999 point out that some governments are unable to commit credibly to a market-oriented policy. For example, an existing market-oriented government can be voted out in favor of a left-wing government that plans to expropriate the gains from privatisation. Biais and Perotti show that a market-oriented government's optimal privatisation strategy is to underprice shares in xed-price o ers and then ration the shares to median-class voters. The allocation of underpriced shares is an inducement for median-class voters to align their interests with those of the market-oriented government. To this end, the governemnt should restrict the amount a vailable to foreigners and wealthy investors. The numberof shares that must beallocated to the median class and the required underpricing both increase with a country's income inequality. This is because greater income inequality implies poorer median-class voters, who require more persuation if they are to reject a left-wing government's policies.
International Evidence of Underpricing for Privatised IPOs
Three recent comprehensive studies have documented widespread phenomenon of underpricing for privatised IPOs across many countries. For a sample of 109 privatisation IPOs in eight countries which does not include Australian companies, Dewenter and Malatesta 1997 conclude that there does not appear to bea general tendency for privatisations to bemore underpriced than privately owned company IPOs. Among the eight countries studied, only the samples in U.K. exhibit a higher degree of underpricing for privatised IPOs, while for the samples in Canada and Malaysia the opposite is true.
Huang and Levich 1998, working with a large sample of 507 privatisation o erings from 39 countries over the period of 1979-1996, also present evidence of underpricing for privatized IPOs. From the cross sectional analysis conducted they nd support for elements of the theories which h a ve been rather successfully in explaining the underpricing of privately-owned IPOs, but they have not found that restricting foreign ownership will increase the magnitude of the underpricing. They conclude, for the privatised IPOs by governments, the results as being consistent with the notion of value maximization, but not with that of political consideration Jones et al. 1999 build upon the work of Perotti 1995 and Biais and Perotti 1999and focus on the political objectives and privatisation through share o erings by governments around the world. Using a sample of 630 share issue privatisations from 59 countries, they nd that the magnitude of the underpricing for privatised IPOs is similar to privately-owned IPOs. They examine how governments tilt their share allocation to favor domestic investors, impose control restrictions on privatised rms, use domestic investment banker as lead underwriter, and use xed-price rather than book building or competitive tender o ers to acieve political objectives. Overall, they nd that governments indeed use share privatisation for such political gains.
Data and Empirical Testing
We begin with a description of the data set, followed by the statistical analyses and interpretation of the obtained results.
Data Set
The starting point for our sample is the report published by the Reserve Bank of Australia see footnote 1. We add Telstra to the sample as it was privatised after the article was published. We also add Bank of Western Australia, which is listed as a trade sale in the article. Further research into the deal indicated however that as part of the agreement between Royal Bank of Scotland and the Western Australian government, 49 of the bank had to be o ered to the public through a oat. In addition, we eliminate Suncorp from the sample as Suncorp was merged with the Metway bank, which w as already a publicly listed company. Table 1 lists the companies which have been privatised through public oat since late 1980s to date. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics for the ten privatisations. These data are collected from the companies' prospectuses. The total market value of the privatised companies is $20.83 billion, from which Telstra accounted for almost 69 of this value. Although six companies restricted foreign ownership to varying degrees, only ve made any special o ers to the current emloyees, with the AIDC employess being granted an optional stake. Restrictons on institutional shareholdings are more uniform across the companies, although AIDC, SGIO, and TABCORP imposed no explicit limits whatsoever. The proportional ownership retained by the government is perhaps indicative of the inexperience with the process with AIDC, the size of the issue, and possibly the sensitivity of the sell-o s" with CBA, QAN and TLS being large comapnies. Whether the partial sales were used as a signalling tool, as suggested by Perotti 1995, is not directly testable. Notably, for all the other privatisations the governments retained almost no equity in the newly public company. Table 3 provides the price information for the 10 privatised companies. The price information for companies and the market are obtained from Datastream and the company prospectuses. The All-Ordinaries Accumulation Index is used as the market index. In preparing Table 3 , we notice that Australian institutional setting for initial public o erings has a number of di erences from the U.S. and other countries. In Australia, prices are set in the prospectuses for a majority of o erings and then distributed to potential small investors, while large institutional investors are often required to bid for their desired holdings. In the U.S. the o ering price is set the day before the listing after a lengthy book building process and therefore, one-day raw returns are simply calculated on the basis of the o er price and the closing price on the rst listing day. By contrast, the market adjusted initial return for an Australian issue is calculated by adjusting the raw return for the movement of the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index between the lodging date of the prospectus and the rst date of trading. The average delay" in listing is about 48 days for the sample in this study.
It is worth noting that in Australia the public oat of a state-owned company m a y involve multiple stages. For example, there were three subsequent sales of Commonwealth Bank of Australia and two so far stages for Telstra. The study, however, focuses only on the market prices and performance of the rst tranch o ering.
Australia's privatisation also features another novel prodcedure -the di erential pricing scheme. Although not uniformly required, some state-owned companies such as Telstra and NSW TAB o ered a xed price to small retail shareholders while allowing the institutions to bid up the price typically in the second stage. Intuitively, the institutional price set in the auction has to be higher than, or at least equal to, the price paid by small investors. Otherwise, it would bepolitically unsuitable for small investors to pay a higher price than the institutions. Because of the small sample size, we are unable to conduct a detailed study of the di erential pricing scheme, but would like to note that when allowed, small investors never paid higher prices than institutional investors.
Based on the information in Table 3 , the unadjusted rst trading day mean and median returns for privatised IPOs are 11.87 and 6.27 respectively, while the Table 3 : Privatised IPOs and their price performance -P 0 is the listing price in the prospectus, P 1 is the rst trading day price, r 1 is the unadjusted return for the rst trading day, and r 1 adj is the market adjusted return for the rst trading day. market adjusted rst trading day mean and median returns are 11.28 and 10.50 respectively. Since the median rates of return are lower than the mean rates of returns, the distribution of the initial return is skewed. This skewness is mainly caused by the higher initial return of Telstra's rst tranch o ering. For example, if we exclude Telstra from calculation, then the average unadjusted initial rate of return would drop from 11.87 to 9.09. It is also interesting to note that weighing the returns on the basis of the issue size, the unadjusted average returns for the 10 companies is 28.02, while the market adjusted average return for the 10 companies is 34.48. Although these returns are quite high, a comparison with other studies is infeasible as much o f the previous research has used equally-weighted average returns.
Testing & Estimation
The rst objective is to test for di erence between the magnitude of underpricing for privatised IPOs and that of privately-owned IPOs. A standard t-statistic test is employed. The test statistic is given by:
where r p is the average privately-owned comply IPO initial return, and is the sample standard deviation of r i , r p . T has the Student's t-distribution with 9 degrees of freedom as the sample contains data for 10 companies.
Based on the previous research by Lee et al. 1996 , r p = 1 1 :86 on the market adjusted basis. This statistic is obtained by calculating the returns on all IPOs listed on the Australian Stock Exchange from January 1976 to December 1989. As we do not have access to more recent data, we compare our result with Lee et al.'s study. Substituting the data required, T = ,0:1007, implying that the magnitude of market-adjusted underpricing for privatised IPOs is not statistically di erent from that of privately-owned IPOs at 99 con dence level. Lee et al. 1996 also report that the unadjusted average inital return for IPOs is 16.41. The t-statistic for the unadjusted initial returns is -1.13, which also implies that the magnitude of unadjusted underpricing for privatised IPOs is not statistically di erent than that of privately-owned IPOs at the conventional con dence levels.
Huang and Levich 1998 report that the initial unadjusted returns for privatised IPOs are 10.8 for OECD countries and 65.2 for non-OECD countries. Again, employing the t-test, we nd that t-statistics are 0.086 and -13.24 respectively. This means that the initial returns for Australian privatised IPOs is not statistically di erent from that of OECD countries, but are signi cantly lower than that of non-OECD countries at the conventional con dence levels.
The second issue to be addressed is regarding the factors which potentially in uence the magnitude of initial returns for privatised IPOs. To c hoose the independent variables, we rely on well established theories and empirical foundings on this topic.
As reviewd in Section 2, in the literature for underpricing of IPOs, the most in uential study is perhaps Rock's information asymmetry theory. This theory implies that the greater the uncertainty about the value of a new issue, the larger the expected underpricing. Following numerous previous studies in this topic, we use the price volatility, i , based on 30 trading days after the o ering as the proxy for uncertainity o f t h e issue to determine its in uence on the degree of underpricing.
IPO markets also tend to be cyclical. During some periods it is hot" and during other periods it is cold" see Ibbotson et al. 1994 . In other words, investors' sentiment is quite important. To accomodate this notion, we use the variable R i , the the return on the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index over 30 trading days prior to the listing of stock i, to measure the market sentiment. This market sentiment theory predicts that the higher the varaible R i , the higher the initial rate of return for the IPO.
Chowdhry and Sherman 1994 argue that IPO initial returns may bepositively related to the length of time between setting the o er price and the o er date. This hypothesis is also consistent with information asymmetry theory. We include the variable D i , the numberof days between the prospectus ling and the listing on the Australian Stock Exchange, in our regression to capture the in uence of time. Beatty and Ritter 1986, and Mauer and Senbet 1996 present evidence that initial returns are negatively related to o ering size. We c hoose the variable S i , the natural logrithm of the ratio of the issuing size over the quarterly GDP, to measure the size e ect on the degree of underpricing for our sample.
Finally, we are interested in determining whether the restriction on institutional holdings has any a ect the magnitude of underpricing for privatised IPOs. Assuming that such restrictions increase the general acceptability of the oat by the general public and making it more politically acceptable, the initial returns for privatised IPOs should be higher for oats with such restrictions than otherwise. Variable I i denotes the proportion of restrictions on institutional holdings as stated in the prospectuses -h o wever, only 7 out of 10 companies explicitly stated such restrictions in their o ering document. Table 4 , we nd that although the adjusted R 2 is very high for both regressions, the independent variables tend to benot signi cant in explaining the magnitude of underpricing. It seems that only D i is somewhat important, but still fragile in explaining the positive relationship between the initial returns and the numberof days between setting the o ering price and the rst day of trading. For most of the other regressors, although the coe cients have signs opposite to expectations, they are not statistically signi cant a t t h e conventional levels.
Judging from the regression results, we may conclude that the underpricing evidence for the Australian privatisation sample is consistent with other international evidence. Although it is surprising that most of the potential explanatory variables suggested by the traditional theories do not have much power, this result is broadly consistent with Dewenter & Malatesta 1997 who also do not nd signi cant results for similar variables when applied to a much larger cross-country sample N=95 of privatisations. It is worth noting that Dewenter and Malatesta regressions only nd one variable named PRIMITIVE which distinguishes between developed and . The overall explanatory power of their regressions R 2 = 0:494 is also comparable to the results obtained in this study. However, Huang and Levich 1998 do nd that traditional theories such as information asymmetry, reputation building, and investor sentiment that are used to model the behavior of privately owned IPOs can also be applied to privatised IPOs.
Discussion
In presenting a general discussion of the results obtained so far, we w ould like to adress the issues related to the size of the o erings and the political consideration which may impact the privatised IPOs. First, the size of some privatised IPO issues such as the Commonwealth Bank, Telstra and Qantas, is relatively large in the Australian capital market. Although the impact of the relative size on the degree of underpricing is rather weak from the result in Table 4 , we notice that, nevertheless, the coe cient of correlation between the relative size the amount issued devided by the quarterly GDP and the degree of market adjusted initial returns of the privatised IPOs is 0.6855.
Second, according to Biais and Perotti 1999 and tested empirically by Jones et al. 1999 , income distribution is important in determining the degree of underpricing as reviewed in Section 2. However, we are unable to test this theory fully, because the Australian Bureau of Statistics ABS does not have the time series data for median household incomes or the Gini coe cient from 1988 to 1998. The ABS has collected such data on a yearly basis only from 1994 onwards. The available Gini coe cient and the median and mean household income were reported in the publication titled Income Distribution, Australia ABS 6523.0, 5 August, 1999". From the reported data, there has been no signi cant change in income distribution in Australia from 1994 to 1998. The Gini coe cient was 0.443 in 1994-95, 0.437 in 1995-96, 0.444 in 1996-97, and 0.446 in 1997-98, respectively . Performing the statistical test based on such a small sample when the the independent variable barely change will not yield useful results.
Because of lacking of income distribution data, we look at potential political inuence from a di erent angle. We notice that four out of ten rms BWA, SGIO, TAH, TLS were privatised under the Coalition governments which are to the right of the centre in the political spectrum. The average market adjusted initial returns for these four rms is 21.80, which is signi cantly higher than that of 4.28 for the other six rms privatised under the Labor governments. This perhaps indicates that the right of centre governments may be more di cult to persuade the general public in privatisation process and therefore o er a higher degree of underpricing for the IPOs. Furthermore, consistent with the studies done by Biais and Perotti 1999, and Jones et al. 1999 , the Australian governments also structure the o erings to further political and economic policy objectives by tilting their share allocation by o ering price discount to favor domestic investors, impose control restrictions on privatised rms, use domestic investment banker as lead underwriter, and restrict institutional and foreign ownerships. Well nanced media campaigns to create awareness about the privatisations and o ering partial interest rate free loans in the form of delayed partial payments can also beconsidered as inducements for median-class voters and as increasing the acceptance of the privatisations by the public.
explanations of underpricing, although the regressions seem to capture as much as 62 of the underpricing. However, the size variable as a stand-alone variable has a high coe cient of correlation with the degree of underpricing, which may indicate for large issues, the market demand may play a role. We have also argued that the Australian governments structure the o erings to further political and economic policy objectives. Because of limitation on data availability, w e are unable to establish rmly the linkage between the median-voter theorem and the degree of underpricing as suggested by Biais and Perotti, but we do notice that the average market adjusted initial returns for the rms privatised under the Coalition governments are signi cantly higher than that of the rms privatised under the Labor governments.
